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Introduction
Thoughtful books on governmental' effectiveness are always in
short supply, and never more so than today.
The Bush Administration was a sink of incompetence (or worse).
Examples abound, but I shall identify only five. Even many of the
most ardent supporters of the Iraq War, such as Senator John McCain,
* Simpnn F. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1 Because the books under review focus on the federal government--exclusively so in the
case of PAUL C. LIGHT, A GOVERNMEN'r ILL EXLLKu I1ED. TEE On rc ' F'E.AL SER-
VICE AND HOW TO REVERSE IT (2008)-my own references to government should be taken to
mean the federal government, unless the context indicates otherwise.
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regard the Administration's prosecution of it, at least up until the 2007
surge, as disastrous. 2 Its performance during and after Hurricane Ka-
trina is almost universally condemned.3 The administration of the De-
partment of Justice by Alberto Gonzales, the former Attorney
General, was notoriously inept and perhaps illegal. 4 A leading writer
concludes (a bit hyperbolically) that "[f]ive years on, the Department
of Homeland Security is still a catastrophe. ' 5 And although many fac-
tors and institutional actors (including Congress) surely contributed to
the current economic meltdown, no one can doubt that the crisis is to
a significant extent due to the maladministration of agencies such as
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission.6
Second, the Obama Administration must deal with an exceed-
ingly daunting agenda of programmatic and administrative decisions
in policy areas as diverse as energy, taxation, the environment, hous-
ing, financial reform, education, trade, national security, foreign pol-
icy, intelligence gathering, and a host of others. Its successes and
failures will depend, at a minimum, on how effectively it deploys the
resources at its disposal and gathers additional resources. With the
administration in effect managing the nation's banking system and
credit markets, there are many reasons to doubt that civil servants and
their political superiors are equal to this extraordinary task.
Third, public confidence in the federal government today is very
low by historic standards. 7 Given the unusually difficult political and
2 See, e.g., Dan Balz & Shailagh Murray, The War Within Sen. McCain, WASH. POST,
Jan. 13, 2007, at Al (describing McCain's sharp criticism of the Bush Administration's handling
of operations in Iraq).
3 See, e.g., James Dao, Louisiana Sees Faded Urgency in Relief Effort, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 2005, at Al.
4 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. AT-
TORNEYS IN 2006, at 356-58 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf
(concluding that the removal of nine U.S. Attorneys was done in a manner that "was unsympa-
thetic and arbitrary, with little oversight by the Attorney General"; that one of the removals may
have been illegal; and that the "primary responsibility for these serious failures" should fall upon
"senior Department leaders," including former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales).
5 Jeffrey Rosen, Man-Made Disaster, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 2008, at 22.
6 I am limiting myself here to agencies whose maladministration is indubitable, without
regard to one's assessment of the merits of the substantive policies that they were charged with
administering. For example, I do not include the Treasury Department's administration of the
Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") or the Federal Reserve Bank's bailout decisions, al-
though both TARP and the bailouts have been severely criticized on a bipartisan basis. See, e.g.,
David M. Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 2008, at Al.
7 LIGHT, supra note 1, at 158-60.
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policy challenges that governments at all levels face today and for the
foreseeable future, such confidence will be difficult, though not impos-
sible, to regain. A relatively recent development strongly supports
this prediction. As one of the books under review here clearly dem-
onstrates, the President and other elected officials on both sides of the
aisle no longer content themselves with merely disparaging this or that
public policy; they now lead the chorus of systemic criticism of govern-
ment competence and capacity.8 Ronald Reagan was not alone in in-
sisting that government is not the solution but the problem. 9
Moreover, increasingly well-educated, well-traveled, and technologi-
cally sophisticated citizens may be more receptive to such systemic
criticisms of government as they hold it to ever higher standards of
professional ethics, wise policymaking, and efficient administration.
The two books under review, then, are particularly welcome. To
begin with, they nicely complement each other. Promoting the Gen-
eral Welfare: New Perspectives on Government Performance (hereinaf-
ter General Welfare), co-edited by political scientists Alan S. Gerber
and Eric M. Patashnik,10 is concerned with the substance of public
policy. A Government Ill Executed: The Decline of the Federal Service
and How to Reverse It (hereinafter Government Ill Executed), by pub-
lic administration scholar Paul C. Light, focuses on how public policy
is administered. Both of these different emphases, of course, are im-
portant. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to decide which is worse:
a well-implemented but unwise policy, or a wise policy that is poorly
implemented.
But although both books address profoundly important subjects,
the bureaucratic crisis documented by Government Ill Executed is the
more urgent in terms both of its ultimate social consequences and the
relative dearth of political, academic, journalistic, and public attention
that it receives. It is the substantive merits and politics of policy pro-
posals that almost always dominates public debates, not the often in-
visible, mundane processes of public administration. Even political
scientists, who should know better, tend to relegate public administra-
tion to a relatively obscure corner of their profession. Whereas the
substance of poliy design :is consided . sex. , the prn of policy
a MIn ,,istration is usually ---n a, well, boring. Alas, these two valua-
8 Id. at 36, 126-28.
9 Id.
10 PROMOTING THE GENERAL WELFARE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT PER-
FORMANCE (Alan S. Gerber & Eric M. Patashnik eds., 2006) [hereinafter GENERAL WELFARE].
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ble books will reinforce this unfortunate and often misleading
stereotype.
I. General Welfare
General Welfare is a far more interesting read than Government
Ill Executed. General Welfare, which exhibits the uneven quality that
afflicts almost all edited books, consists of fourteen chapters by lead-
ing political scientists and economists. The book's structure is well
conceived. The first two chapters explore the problem of government
failure in general, and explain how good policy analysis can improve
the quality of governmental choices." As is customary among profes-
sional policy analysts, the authors of these chapters employ the tech-
nocratic criterion of efficiency, defined as potential Pareto
improvement (formally termed the Kaldor-Hicks criterion), as the
measure of good policy.12 In this usage, "[t]he relevant test is whether
a policy change produces sufficient social benefits that winners could
theoretically compensate losers and still come out ahead.' 1 3 As the
authors note, "[t]his concept.., is not uncontroversial. Its implemen-
tation requires the ability to measure gains and losses in a common
metric. Moreover, in practice, the transfer payments needed to com-
pensate losers may not be made. ' 14 As sophisticated scholars, the au-
thors are keenly aware of the normative and instrumental limitations
of policy analysis so conceived. Such criticisms, after all, are a staple
of professional policy debates.15 Nevertheless, they ably defend it as
an indispensable, but not dispositive, tool for decisionmakers con-
fronted with complex choices. 16 Alas, there is no sign that such analy-
sis had any influence on the gigantic 2009 stimulus package,17 which
11 Alan S. Gerber & Eric M. Patashnik, Government Performance: Missing Opportunities
to Solve Problems, in GENERAL WELFARE, supra note 10, at 3 (chapter 1); David L. Weimer &
Aidan R. Vining, Policy Analysis in Representative Democracy, in GENERAL WELFARE, supra
note 10, at 19 (chapter 2).
12 Gerber & Patashnik, supra note 11, at 5.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (criticizing the use of cost-benefit
analysis in the regulation of the environment, health, and life); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL
A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: How COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PRO-
TECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008) (advocating the reform of cost-benefit anal-
ysis in regulatory decisionmaking).
16 See Gerber & Patashnik, supra note 11, at 5; Weimer & Vining, supra note 11, at 19,
24-25, 31-35.
17 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.
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will likely preempt almost all other discretionary domestic policy
choice for years to come.
Four chapters present detailed case studies of difficult policy deci-
sions: whether to support a particular surgical intervention of plausi-
ble but doubtful efficacy;18 how to design urban transportation
systems;19 how to promote affordable housing;20 and how to allocate
special education funds.21 Each of these chapters contains much fasci-
nating data and analysis, which greatly enriches one's understanding
of the contexts relevant to that particular policy domain: its constella-
tion of interest groups, the history of policy development in that area,
the substantive and process issues that must be resolved, and the
likely gainers and losers from specific policy choices.
These authors are particularly keen to emphasize the vast ineffi-
ciencies that characterize current policies. The chapter on urban
transportation by Clifford Winston, an economist at the Brookings In-
stitution, presents especially dramatic evidence of the magnitude of
these inefficiencies, the inequitable ways in which current policies dis-
tribute their bloated costs and exaggerated benefits, and the formida-
ble institutional obstacles to reform. Government's design of urban
mass transit policy, Winston shows, has been utterly ineffective. Here
are some of his findings. Between 1960 and 2000, a period of active
governmental promotion of mass transit, its share of all trips in large
urban areas fell from more than 20% to less than 3%.22 Mass transit
load factors are very low; in the mid-1990s (the most recent data pe-
riod), rail filled only 18% of its seats with paying customers; the com-
parable figure for buses was 14%.23 Partly for this reason, operating
deficits "are a serious drain on the public purse. By 2002, transit oper-
ating expenses in the United States were about $27 billion a year,
more than twice the yearly $13 billion in operating revenues. Contin-
uing capital investments are swelling this deficit .... "24 As is often
true, these immense public losses redound to the economic benefit of
18 Alan S. Gerber & Eric M. Patashnik, Sham Surgery: The Problem of Inadequate Medi-
cal Evidence, in GENERAL WELFARE, supra note 10, at 43 (chapter 3).
19 Clifford Winston, Urban Transportation, in GENERAL WELFARE, supra note 10, at 74
(chapter 4).
20 Edgar 0. Olsen. Achieving Fundamental Housing Policy Reform, in GENERAL WEL-
FARE, supra note 10, at 100 (chapter 5).
21 Jay P. Greene, Fixing Special Education, in GENERAL WELFARE, supra note 10, at 128
(chapter 6).
22 Winston, supra note 19, at 76-77.
23 Id. at 77.
24 Id.
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special interests: "as much as 75 percent of federal spending on mass
transit ends up in the pockets of transit workers (as above-market
wages) or goes to suppliers of transit capital equipment (as higher
profits and interest). Just 25 percent is used to improve transit and
lower fares. '25 None of this should surprise any well-informed system
designer acquainted with the history of mass transit policymaking:
"ridership tends to be grossly overestimated at the planning stage,
while capital and operating costs are underestimated. '26
Conventional wisdom blames the failures of mass transit systems
on automobile usage and expenditures on the highway system, which
are thought to starve the potentially more efficient mass transit sys-
tems. And indeed, much highway spending does exhibit its own ineffi-
ciencies quite apart from its deleterious effects on mass transit usage.
For example, each "dollar of highway spending.., reduces congestion
costs to road users only about eleven cents," 27 and "'high-occupancy-
vehicle' (HOV) lanes sometimes carry fewer people than general-pur-
pose lanes, attract many family members who would ride together
anyway, and shift some travelers from vanpools or buses to low-occu-
pancy carpools. ''28 But Winston shows that the conventional wisdom
is wrong, or at least very misleading. The huge excess capacity on
buses and trains "prevents transit from realizing its [theoretical] com-
petitive advantage over the auto. Transit's average operating costs per
seat mile are lower than an auto's, but its empty seats drive its operat-
ing costs per passenger mile above the auto's. '29 He also identifies
some of the other sources of mass transit's inefficiency. For example,
the typical Metrobus driver in Washington, D.C., is paid twice as much
as drivers for the handful of private bus companies there.30 Transit
productivity has fallen 40 percent since the public takeover in the
1960s.31 And transportation legislation is filled with earmarks and
pork barrel projects, whether the spending is on highways or mass
transit systems.32
25 Id. Elsewhere, Winston notes that train operators and station agents for the BART
system in San Francisco are paid more than $40,000 a year, roughly the average household in-
come of bus commuters. Id. at 85.
26 Id. at 78.
27 Id. at 80.
28 Id. at 86.
29 Id. at 83.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 83-85. Winston notes that the "Bud Shuster Highway" in Pennsylvania, named
after the local congressman with immense power over appropriations for highway projects, "car-
ries less traffic in a year than the Washington, D.C., Capital Beltway carries in three days." Id. at
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Winston's conclusion is that government policy has failed
dismally:
[V]irtually all urban rail transit systems are not even socially
desirable-that is, the benefits they provide to users and to
motorists, truckers, and shippers by reducing road conges-
tion fall short of their subsidies-but ... these systems will
continue to-evolve because they enjoy strong support from
urban planners, suppliers of transit capital and labor, civic
boosters, and city and federal policymakers.33
Although vast efficiency gains could be achieved through policy
changes such as privatization, congestion pricing, and more systematic
use of cost-benefit analysis in the design of transportation policy, Win-
ston states, "I have come to believe that it is futile to expect public
officials to consider such changes, because urban transportation policy
is largely shaped by entrenched political forces [that] . . . promise
more of the same for the future. ' '34 Only privatization, he predicts,
could hope to weaken these forces.35 These conclusions, mutatis mu-
tandis, are echoed in the chapters on special education and housing.36
General Welfare's next two chapters elucidate two relatively re-
cent innovations in public decisionmaking-decision markets37 and
policy experimentation 38-that hold some promise for improving the
empirical basis for programmatic designs and other government deci-
sions. Typically, both of these techniques employ market choices to
generate and aggregate information about public preferences, policy
consequences, and other ingredients of rational policy design and im-
plementation that will be more accurate than the radically deficient
information and assumptions on which conventional policy decisions
tend to be based.
Decision markets in which bettors use hard cash and have power-
ful incentives to predict accurately have been successful in a number
of settings. As Robin Hanson, the author of chapter seven, explains:
84. See also Richard L. Berke, Lawmaker Takes Highway to Power, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1997,
at A18 (describing Shuster's power to "dole[ ] out money" as chairman of the House Transporta-
tion and Infrastructure Committee).
33 ad at 86.
34 Id. at 75.
35 Id. at 75, 87-95.
36 See Greene, supra note 21, at 141-44 (special education); Olsen, supra note 20, at
100-06, 109-12 (housing).
37 Robin Hanson, Decision Markets for Policy Advice, in GENERAL WELFARE, supra note
10, at 151 (chapter 7).
38 Charles A. Holt et al., An Experimental Basis for Public Policy Initiatives, in GENERAL
WELFARE, supra note 10, at 174 (chapter 8).
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Orange juice futures improve on National Weather Service
forecasts, horse race markets beat horse race experts, Acad-
emy Award markets beat columnist forecasts, gas demand
markets beat gas demand experts, stock markets beat the of-
ficial NASA panel at fingering the guilty company in the
Challenger accident, election markets beat national opinion
polls, and corporate sales markets beat official corporate
forecasts. 3
9
Designers of artificially contrived decision markets proceed by
creating test settings in which people act as market speculators de-
ploying a stock of limited resources to make bets on possible out-
comes of the policy choices that the tester wants to consider and
inform. Hanson analyzes the conditions under which decision market
designers might hope to generate predictions about the crucial policy-
relevant facts that are more accurate than other estimating methods.
The decision options must be important enough to justify the costs
entailed in seeking the greater accuracy promised by a decision mar-
ket.40 The options tested by the decision market must have enough
influence on the future outcomes that those outcomes are not
swamped by random fluctuations.41 The options must also be care-
fully defined and distinguished from one another, and the outcomes
must be measureable. 42 The information available to the speculators
must reasonably approximate the information that is available to ac-
tual policymakers.43 There must be enough informed speculators to
render reliable the price signals produced by their bets.44 Their stakes
in the bet must be high enough to give them a reason to care about its
accuracy. 45 Speculators must be protected against retaliation, manipu-
lation, or other improper influences on their bets.46 Finally, the legal
costs of market creation must be low enough, and the public must find
the results credible, accurate, and politically neutral.47 The author's
case study of the now-defunct Policy Analysis Market, designed to im-
prove predictions about terrorist activity, illustrates both the possibili-
ties and the many potential pitfalls of this approach. 48
39 Hanson, supra note 37, at 156.
40 Id. at 158.
41 Id. at 159.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 159-60.
44 Id. at 160.
45 Id. at 160-61.
46 Id. at 161.
47 Id. at 163.
48 Id. at 164-70.
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Public policy experiments, like decision markets, are designed to
provide better factual predictions concerning the preferences, behav-
iors, and consequences that are crucial to the relative effectiveness in
the real world of different policy choices. In their discussion of this
approach, the authors describe several field and laboratory experi-
ments using public auction techniques that either succeeded in im-
proving programmatic effectiveness or promise to do so in the future.
They involve efforts to reduce wasteful agricultural irrigation in Geor-
gia, to allocate nitrogen oxide emissions in Virginia under a very tight
regulatory time constraint, to allocate landing slots in congested air-
ports, and the design of government strategy in an important antitrust
case.49 Curiously, the authors do not mention the two most important
examples of federally funded experimental policy research ever con-
ducted. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment 50 influenced health
policy for decades and seems destined to play an important role in the
Obama Administration's efforts to reform the health insurance sys-
tem. The Income Maintenance Experiments conducted in various
parts of the United States in the 1970s51 have provided an indispensa-
ble empirical basis for predictions about the behavior of low-income
individuals and families in the face of different kinds of subsidy ar-
rangements. Indeed, its findings about the adverse effects of income
subsidies on family stability contributed to the defeat in Congress of
welfare reform proposals.5 2
Two chapters analyze federalism's capacity to utilize state-by-
state variations to foster policy improvements. Legal scholar Roberta
Romano shows how corporate law innovation led by the state of Dela-
ware has generated widespread, socially desirable effects throughout
the country,53 while political scientist Mark Rom argues that only
49 Holt et al., supra note 38, at 177-91.
50 This experiment spawned many publications. See RAND's Health Insurance Experi-
ment (HIE): Bibliography of HIE Publications, http://www.rand.org/health/projects/hie/hiepubs.
html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
51 IRP Negative Income Tax Archive: Information Sources for Income Maintenance Ex-
periments, http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/nit/NITindex.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
52 Email from Henry J. Aaron, Bruce and Virginia MacLaury Senior Fellow, The Brook-
ings Institution, to Peter H. Schuck, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law School
(Feb. 1, 2uJ9) (on file with author); s'ee uLu vtj ,... , ........... -;- nf, th,
Subcomm. on Public Assistance of the S. Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong. 23-28 (1978) (state-
ments of Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan, Chairman, Subcomm. on Public Assistance; Hon. Joseph A.
Califano, Secretary, Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare; and Dr. Henry Aaron, Assistant
Secretary, Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare).
53 Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition
for Corporate Charters, in GENERAL WELFARE, supra note 10, at 282 (chapter 13).
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under limited conditions can states operate as Brandeisian laborato-
ries of innovation fostering imitation by others.
54
The remaining chapters of General Welfare turn to the ability of
political institutions-specifically Congress, the political parties, and
the states-to design and implement effective policies in the public
interest. These excellent, often provocative chapters are full of inter-
esting observations and specific examples of good and bad policymak-
ing, and about the possible behavioral and structural reasons for each
kind. Sarah Binder cites a number of legislative successes that appear
to have confounded the public choice, rent-seeking model that now
dominates political economy debates-the 1990 emissions-trading
program aimed at acid rain, the 1986 tax reform law, the 1996 welfare
and agricultural reforms, and military base closing laws-and empha-
sizes the importance of correctly designing Congress's incentives, in-
formation flows, and institutions.55 David Mayhew distinguishes
problem-solving from other kinds of policymaking, such as redistribu-
tion, and then identifies ten attributes, many reflecting the Progressive
Era's technocratic, accountability, and non-partisanship values, that
he thinks conduce to problem-solving. 56 Finding that Congress's "re-
port card is not very favorable," 57 Mayhew proposes a number of
changes designed to push politicians away from partisanship and to-
ward the center.58 Morris Fiorina boldly reassesses his earlier en-
dorsement of strong, politically responsible parties,59 a widely-held
position among political scientists until quite recently. His wish hav-
ing been fulfilled, he now laments that political conditions have
changed in ways-higher electoral stakes, greater conflict, a gap be-
tween moderate voters and an ideologically polarized political class,
more mobilized single-issue interest groups, and increased disinforma-
tion and outright lies-that engender a kind of buyer's remorse on his
part.60 A duly chastened Fiorina declines to make broad recommen-
54 Mark Carl Rom, Taking the Brandeis Metaphor Seriously: Policy Experimentation
Within a Federal System, in GENERAL WELFARE, supra note 10, at 256 (chapter 12).
55 Sarah A. Binder, Can Congress Serve the General Welfare?, in GENERAL WELFARE,
supra note 10, at 199 (chapter 9).
56 David R. Mayhew, Congress as Problem Solver, in GENERAL WELFARE, supra note 10,
at 219-220, 224-30 (chapter 10).
57 Id. at 224.
58 Id. at 230-34.
59 Morris P Fiorina, Parties as Problem Solvers, in GENERAL WELFARE, supra note 10, at
237 (chapter 11).
60 See id. at 239-51.
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dations for reform, concluding with the rather unhelpful point that
parties will inevitably change to meet new conditions. 61
In the concluding chapter, political scientist Eugene Bardach dis-
tinguishes the two general approaches used in the book-public
choice and problem-solving-and seeks to explain why political scien-
tists have given so much more attention to the former than to the
latter.62 He cogently reminds liberal academics who favor redistribu-
tion to the poor that the kinds of inefficient policies documented in
the first part of the book tend to favor the already advantaged and
thus should be challenged in the name of distributive justice, not only
efficiency. 63 By the same token, those who emphasize efficiency
should recognize the limitations of their analytical tools, particularly
as applied to policies with strong symbolic and redistributive con-
tent.64 Bardach closes on a cautionary note that applies to the book as
a whole: in the extraordinarily complex world of politics, it is very
difficult to establish reliable empirical propositions about the causal
relationships between particular institutions and the behavior of polit-
ical actors, 65 propositions on which any sound reform agenda must ul-
timately depend.
Two examples demonstrate Bardach's point. Leading political
scientists like Mayhew and Fiorina are remarkably tentative and cir-
cumspect in making any empirical claims about precisely how the vari-
able of party strength actually affects voters, politicians, and other
policymakers. The same can be said about the effects of legislative
transparency, which may increase accountability but leave less room
for compromise. 66 A similar predictive modesty should apply to pre-
dictions about the political effects of structural and policy variables
such as campaign finance law,67 ideology, voter turnout, media cover-
age, issue framing and aggregation, 68 social diversity, 69 politicians'
subsequent career opportunities, 70 and a host of others.
61 See id. at 251-52.
62 Eugene Bardach, Two Perspectives on Governmental Underperformance, in GENERAL
WELFARE, supra note 10, at 309 (chapter 14).
63 See id. at 310.
64 Id. at 313-15.
65 Id. at 322.
66 See Mayhew, supra note 56, at 224.
67 Cf id. at 223-24, 232.
68 Cf Binder, supra note 55, at 210-13; Fiorina, supra note 59, at 249.
69 Cf Mayhew, supra note 56, at 228.
70 Cf. id. at 233.
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II. Government Ill Executed
If General Welfare analyzes how government officials can design
more efficient public policies in order to accomplish more social good
with a given level of resources, Paul Light's Government Ill Executed
warns that even optimally designed policies would be undermined or
distorted by a poorly functioning bureaucracy. Light's message is
crystal clear-and profoundly dismaying. The federal career service,
he maintains, is in serious crisis, experiencing a long-term decline in
quality, accountability, vision, energy, and professional commitment.
The book's "Light"-motif is a conflict between Alexander Hamil-
ton and Thomas Jefferson concerning the values that ought to shape
the emerging federal bureaucracy. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton
both advocated an "energetic" civil service capable of animating the
energy in the executive that he considered the defining virtue of the
presidency, and established what he hoped would be a model of such a
service in the Department of the Treasury.71 From this model, Light
deduces seven necessary characteristics of an energetic federal service:
"[m]issions that matter for the public benefit," "[c]larity of com-
mand," "[p]osts of honor," "[v]igor and expedition," "[a] spirit of ser-
vice," "[s]teadiness in administration," and "[s]afety in the executive"
(defined by Hamilton as "responsibility to the people").72 In contrast,
Jefferson advocated a limited federal service in which frequent rota-
tion in office would avert sinecures, privilege, and rigidity.73 He ar-
gued that "'drudgery and subsistence' would be 'a wise and necessary
precaution against the degeneracy of the public servants.' ,,74 Events,
of course, would confound both of their visions.
Light organizes the bulk of his book according to Hamilton's just-
listed administrative values. While these values seem generally unex-
ceptionable-even Jefferson would probably accept most if not all of
them as an abstract matter-they nevertheless constitute an awkward
and somewhat artificial skeleton for structuring the book.75 First, they
significantly overlap-for example, clarity of command, steadiness in
71 LIGrr, supra note 1, at 6 ("He pursued a tight chain of command from the top of his
department to the bottom, placed experienced officers at key intersections in the hierarchy, re-
cruited federal employees with the competence to do their jobs well, tried to establish a pipeline
of future recruits, argued for steadiness in administration, and endorsed the need for trans-
parency and competence as a guarantee of responsibility to the public.").
72 Id. at 7-9.
73 Id. at 9-12.
74 Id. at 9-10 (quoting 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 14 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1896)).
75 For example, chapter seven is entitled "Safety in the Executive," which pays homage to
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administration, and vigor. Because of this extensive overlap, the dis-
cussion is highly and annoyingly repetitious, with Light making the
same points over and over again, albeit under different rubrics. Sec-
ond, these Hamiltonian values are not well-defined, as befits the em-
bryonic stage of democratic and bureaucratic development during
which Hamilton set pen to paper.
Light's database mobilizes several different types of information.
The most frequently deployed category consists of responses by citi-
zens and federal officials to survey questions posed by Light and other
researchers about government performance,7 6 responses that he thinks
help to confirm the decline of the federal service proclaimed in the
book's subtitle.
In addition, Light distills from the federal statutes enacted be-
tween 1943 and 2000 a list of the government's most important mis-
sions.77 This list demonstrates the quite remarkable growth in the
government's programmatic ambitions during this period, 8 a growth
that even President Ronald Reagan could only slow, not reverse. 79 He
also shows that various techniques that every modern president has
instituted in order to eliminate bad programs, reduce wasteful spend-
ing, narrow the agenda by devolving authority to the states, and
"starve the beast" through deep tax cuts, have failed to turn the tide.80
In another empirical effort, Light distills and lists the federal gov-
ernment's fifty greatest programmatic missions as of 2000, and then
searches-unsuccessfully, it turns out-for some consensus among
historians and political scientists about which of these missions are
most and least important, most and least difficult to achieve, and most
successful and unsuccessful. 81 This lack of consensus probably ex-
plains the disjunction he found in his 2006 survey between the ex-
pressed anxieties of Americans about certain long-term problems-
for example, entitlement program solvency, global warming, infra-
structure, terrorism, and immigration-and Congress's ability to enact
policies that might require the short-term sacrifices in the form of
higher taxes, benefit cuts, or polarization necessary to solve the
Hamilton'- schema but. being concerned with ascertaining government's true size, has only the
most tenuous bearing on safety.
76 See, e.g., La. at i49-53 (suivryinig graduatcs at !eadng -rofe--sional schools of public
service about their experiences with federal service).
77 Id. at 24-27.
78 Id. at 22-29.
79 Id. at 36.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 38-46.
HeinOnline -- 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 985 2008-2009
The George Washington Law Review
problems.8 2 The big exception here is terrorism, about which congres-
sional attention is fairly congruent with public concern.
8 3
Perhaps his most interesting and consequential data concerns the
"thickening" of the federal bureaucratic hierarchy-"more layers of
leaders and more leaders per layer"-among both political appointees
and the senior career service.84 Much of this thickening, Light says,
reflects two factors that together increase pressures for promotion: the
rapid aging of the federal workforce as baby boomer employees un-
leash what one study calls a "'retirement tsunami,"' and the desire to
circumvent frequent congressional pay freezes. 85 Even the supposedly
management-oriented George W. Bush Administration has presided
over "a significant expansion in both the height and width of the fed-
eral hierarchy well beyond best practices anywhere else, most notably
in the business sector. '8 6 This is evident in his list of titles open for
occupancy by senior (and not so senior) officials. I'll bet that you did
not know that there are now many officials who are denominated
"[d]eputy deputy assistant secretary," "[a]ssociate deputy assistant
secretary," "[d]eputy associate deputy administrator," and "[c]hief of
staff to the associate deputy assistant secretary," and that this thicken-
ing has occurred in almost every department.8 7 "Bluntly put," Light
writes, "you are nobody in Washington, D.C., if you do not have a
chief of staff. '8
This thickening would merely be amusing fodder for Jon Stewart,
talk radio hosts, and other bureaucracy-bashers were the public policy
consequences not so grave. Citing the examples of the Challenger and
Columbia tragedies and the FBI's failure to heed its low-level agents'
warnings about specific terrorist threats before 9/11, Light attributes
these calamities to thickening and implies that these are only the fail-
82 See id. at 46-47. Light's reading of his own data regarding the differences between the
major parties on the need for swift action seems inconsistent. After stating that their priority
rankings for these issues differ, id. at 47, he says that the party differences are "small." Id. at 49.
83 Id. at 48.
84 Id. at 53.
85 Id. at 54, 57, 132. Light notes that more than 450,000 federal jobs were cut during the
1990s. Id. at 137. He notes that "40 percent of the Homeland Security Department's managers
will be eligible for retirement in 2009, 42 percent of the Senior Executive Service is expected to
retire by 2010, and the attrition rate among air traffic controllers is expected to triple by 2012."
Id. at 134-35. In total, "the federal government will hire roughly 200,000 new employees a year
until the 2020s, only a third of them in response to the retirement tsunami." Id. at 134.
86 Id. at 58.
87 Id. at 59-61. "Once established somewhere in government, titles spread like kudzu as
departments and agencies copy each other at will." Id. at 57. Late Senator Daniel Patrick Moy-
nihan called this the "iron law of emulation." Id. at 72 (quotation omitted).
88 See id. at 65.
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ures that come to public attention, surely just the tip of the iceberg.89
He finds that in those categories of frontline federal jobs providing the
most important public services (e.g., air traffic controllers and IRS
agents), employees in 1996 reported upward through sixteen layers; on
policy and budget questions, "the average federal employee received
guidance through nearly sixty layers of decision makers." 9 Even in
the Clinton Administration, which reduced overall federal employ-
ment significantly (largely through the post-Cold War peace divi-
dend), the middle levels of government grew relative to the lower
levels,91 which impedes a fair allocation of accountability for failure
and credit for success. 92 This growth and widening occurred despite
the new orthodoxy of hierarchical flattening and decentralized author-
ity in the private and non-profit sectors.93
Light's data also serves to indict the very process by which presi-
dential appointees are vetted. This process, which applies to some of-
ficials who are many layers below the top,94 is not merely sluggish,95
centralized, and bureaucratic; it is also a minefield for aspirants to
public service, one that treats candidates as "'innocent until nomi-
nated."' 96 President Obama's remarkably quick start in nominating
his Cabinet and key sub-Cabinet subordinates made the subsequent
withdrawals of several of them in the first month after his inaugura-
tion all the more humbling.97 This might be acceptable if the process
produced higher quality officials, but Light, after considering various
indices of quality, finds that the opposite is true.98 The state of the
federal service, he concludes, has been declining since the Carter
years when presidents and other top officials began to attack the bu-
89 See id. at 56.
90 Id. at 67 (emphasis added). Reorganization can actually magnify this thickening. Light
finds that splitting an existing department "can produce a hierarchy greater than the sum of its
former parts." Id. at 70.
91 Id. at 75, 197-99.
92 Id. at 76.
93 Id. at 73.
94 Id. at 81-82.
95 Whereas President Kennedy needed about two months to get his appointees confirmed
by the Senate, it took President George W. Bush more than nine n...hs. Id. at 87 88.
96 id. at 79.
97 As Professor Light recently told the New York Times, "'[t]hey were really fast in the
first 100 meters,' ... 'but this is a 10,000-meter process, and they've slowed down quite dramati-
cally. I would have bet you the farm they'd break the recent record, but now they're on pace to
become the slowest."' Peter Baker, Obama Team Has Billions to Spend, but Few Ready to Do It,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A17.
98 LicrTr, supra note 1, at 96-99.
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reaucracies that they led.99 Officials' morale is lower than that of their
private non-profit counterparts. 100 None of the resources needed to
perform their jobs well are sufficiently available.1°1 Especially at the
middle and lower levels where most of the work of government gets
done, they criticize the competence of their own colleagues and rate
their organizations unfavorably in terms of spending money wisely,
helping people, acting fairly, and being worthy of trust.10 2 No wonder,
then, that they say they work for the government for the pay, benefits,
and security, rather than out of public spiritedness; 10 3 that for Ameri-
cans entering the job market "[t]he federal services comes in last in
almost every indicator, from the motivation to make a difference to
organizational resources" well behind private non-profit organiza-
tions; 104 that the graduates of the top professional schools of public
administration and the select corps of Presidential Management Fel-
lows express similarly negative views; 10 5 and that this chorus of criti-
cism by these most knowledgeable people has increased over the
years.
1 0 6
This situation cries out for reform, and Congress has responded
with lots of it-indeed, as Light shows, far too much of it, given the
forms that it has taken. He counts no fewer than 177 "major reform
statutes" enacted between 1945 and 2002, which he divides into four
reform philosophies, two of which are trusting of government (he
terms them "scientific" management and "liberation" management)
and two of which are distrustful ("war on waste" and "watchful
eye"). 107 Although the pace of reform has accelerated in recent de-
cades, 0 8 it is the nature of these reforms that is most significant. In-
creasingly, Congress has emphasized the distrustful variety, with more
detailed, rule-based requirements and reorganizations. 10 9 Moreover,
99 See id. at 106, 126-28. Light views President George H.W. Bush as the exception, who
he characterizes as having "genuine affection for the federal service." Id. at 128.
1oo Id. at 111.
101 Id. at 113.
102 Id. at 113-20.
103 Id. at 110, 119-20.
104 Id. at 139, 143.
105 Id. at 149-55. "Eighty percent [of the Fellows] said their organization did a poor job of
disciplining poor performers." Id. at 155. Approximately 150 schools of public administration
exist. Jason DeParle, A Plan to Lift the Lowly Bureaucrat to a Status of Cherished Public Ser-
vant, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at A14.
106 LIGTrr, supra note 1, at 149-58.
107 Id. at 166-68.
108 Forty-one percent of these "major reform statutes" were passed between 1985 and 2002.
Id. at 168.
109 Id. at 176.
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Congress's perennial institutional distrust of, and fierce competitive-
ness with, the administration has limited the president's role in re-
forming "his" bureaucracy. 110 Light, quoting political scientist Terry
Moe, explains why we can therefore expect most bureaucratic reforms
to be ineffective: "'In the economic system, organizations are gener-
ally designed by participants who want them to succeed. In the politi-
cal system, public bureaucracies are designed in no small measure by
participants who explicitly want them to fail.""" Light shows how
Congress ensures this failure by not enhancing-indeed often crip-
pling-the bureaucracy's capacity to comply with the new require-
ments. For example, it distracts federal employees from their
substantive work, diverts scarce programmatic resources, undermines
other administrative values, and creates constant chaos in
management.1
12
Even the size of the federal government is opaque, and one of
Light's contributions is to penetrate the fog in order to reveal the
"hidden workforce"-including government contractors, grantees,
and state and local government employees who operate under federal
mandates-and thus to gauge its true magnitude. 1 3 According to his
calculations, which he properly surrounds with the appropriate meth-
odological and statistical caveats, the federal government in 2005 con-
sisted of approximately 1.8 million civil servants, 7.6 million contract
jobs, 2.8 million grant jobs, 1.4 million military personnel, and almost
0.8 million postal service jobs, for a grand total of 14.6 million.14 This
total represented a growth of 2.5 million in just the three years be-
tween 2002 and 2005, of which the greatest increase was in contract
employees.115 Although the latter consisted disproportionately of
workers in Iraq and Afghanistan, the increase occurred in all areas of
government and mostly involved services.' 16 As Light explains, the
federal government's strong preference for contract employees and
(usually unfunded) mandates to state and local governments has a
straightforward explanation: the chronic hiring freezes promoted by
contractors (who are often lavish campaign contributors) and politi-
110 Id. at 176-77.
111 Id. at 178 (quoting Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Structurai Choice Tw. T,,ry, of
Public Bureaucracy, in KkANi ZATI o TiiEo.Ey: FRnM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE PRESENT
AND BEYOND 116, 127 (Oliver E. Williamson ed. 1995)).
112 See id. at 170-74, 182-84.
113 Id. at 190-91.
114 Id. at 197 tbl.7.1.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 202-03.
HeinOnline -- 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 989 2008-2009
The George Washington Law Review
cians of both parties wielding anti-bureaucracy and pro-outsourcing
rhetoric.117 At the same time, however, official oversight of these con-
tracts is grossly inadequate, undermining transparency and accounta-
bility to the public.""
As is usually true of analyses of really tough problems, Light's
descriptions are more convincing than his prescriptions. Like many
reformers, he would eschew incrementalism in favor of comprehen-
sive reform, citing the massive impending baby boom retirements as
an unparalleled opportunity to launch change.119 He proposes, first, to
set priorities among competing missions according to their impor-
tance, past success in problem solving, and the difficulty of achieving
results.120 Next, he would impose a temporary moratorium on filling
vacant jobs in order to "thin" the bureaucracy with a goal of having no
more than six layers between top and bottom, reducing the number of
"alter-ego" titles, and redistributing jobs toward operations at the bot-
tom.'2 ' Even more controversially, he would reduce by half the num-
ber of presidential appointments, and would address the problem of
delays by abolishing any appointee position that is not filled within six
months of a vacancy.122 Light would seek higher quality employees by
modeling the federal service on the private non-profit model that, as
noted earlier, enjoys higher regard among current and potential offi-
cials. 123 He would also encourage more lateral entry, especially at
middle and senior levels, and would "insourc[e]" all "inherently gov-
ernment jobs that have slipped out of the civil service" unless private
contractors can prove a significant cost advantage. 124 In this same
spirit, President Obama's budget hopes to reduce reliance on private
contractors, but his ambitious plans for rapid economic stabilization-
including the financial bailouts, mortgage renegotiations, and massive
stimulus-may require more, not less, outside expertise.
125
117 Id. at 206-08. Five large contractors "received more than 20 percent of all contracts
awarded in 2005," and contracts were "the fastest growing component of discretionary spend-
ing." Id. at 208-09.
118 Id. at 210-11.
119 Id. at 214-16.
120 Id. at 227-28.
121 Id. at 227-29.
122 Id. at 230-31.
123 Id. at 233.
124 Id. at 233-37. For a new analysis of outsourcing, see GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
125 See Cam Simpson & Christopher Conkey, Obama Aims to Use Fewer Contractors,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, at A4.
[Vol. 77:973
HeinOnline -- 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 990 2008-2009
2009] Is a Competent Federal Government Becoming Oxymoronic? 991
Conclusion
The advent of the Obama Administration makes both of these
books particularly timely, if not urgent. We are clearly entering an era
of expansive government, one that in terms of the sheer magnitude of
governmental influence over the economy may eventually dwarf that
of the New Deal. This fact, in combination with the new President's
remarkable magnetism and the unusual number of vacancies that will
occur, makes the prospect for reinvigorating the federal career service
as bright as it has been for 75 years. 126 As more evidence that the time
is ripe for fundamental renovation, former Senator Hillary Clinton
and some of her former colleagues proposed legislation to create a
public service academy modeled on West Point.127
Still, skepticism is amply warranted; as Light points out, the gov-
ernment has long been "awash in reform" and we have little to show
for it.128 The problems of public bureaucracy may go deeper than
even Light realizes, inhering in the task structure and political envi-
ronment that inevitably surround it.129 These deficiencies, which both
feed and reflect a culture and ideology of contempt for bureaucracy,
make it that much harder for reformers to persuade politicians and
the public that more resources, prestige, and trust are warranted-a
classic chicken-and-egg dilemma. Although the civil services of some
other nations-Britain, France, and Singapore, for example-are re-
puted to be of higher quality, their constitutional systems differ signifi-
cantly from our public administration, and many of these differences
seem to enhance their performance and social status while diminishing
ours.
30
Nevertheless, the dawn of a promising new presidency is not a
time for pessimism. If progress can be made in improving the quality
of our national government, these books will certainly help to chart
the way.
126 There is some preliminary evidence that young people are responding to these condi-
tions. See June Kronholz, Help Wanted: Massive Bureaucracy Promises Exciting New Opportu-
nity, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2008, at A6 (noting, in an article discussing young workers in
government, that 300,000 people applied for jobs on the Obama website during the first month
I1 Lhe transition).
127 DeParle, supra note 105.
128 See LIGHT, supra note 1, at 187.
129 See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do
AND WHY THEY Do IT (1989) (finding that the work of bureaucratic rank-and-file employees
and managers is shaped by individual beliefs, peer expectations, embedded interests, the impetus
of founding members, and the political environment).
130 Cf. id. at 295-301 (describing the differences in bureaucratic behavior created by parlia-
mentary democracy).
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